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ABSTRACT 
Turkey is in the middle of the three most problematic regions of the world. 
Therefore, it maintains one of the largest militaries in the world. To man such a big army, 
the conscription system has been used for the last century. However, this study shows 
that conscription is not the best system for Turkey's defense needs. The most valuable 
resource of Turkey, manpower, is not efficiently allocated in the defense sector. An all- 
volunteer force provides an effective defense without additional cost. This study also 
argues that population growth will force the government to find an alternative to the 
current universal draft system. To reduce the effect of population growth, the government 
has been using a selective monetary service in the last two decades. But, this temporary 
solution cannot survive for a long time. 
This study concludes that an all-volunteer force can bring efficiency to the 
defense department. It can increase the personnel quality and military readiness. 
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I.       TURKISH DEFENSE NEEDS 
A.        INTRODUCTION 
Before determining the optimum defense structure, nations should analyze their 
security environment. National resources would be wasted if there is a gap between the 
current defense structure and an optimum structure. A weak defense would lead to greater 
costs in human life while an overfunded defense would deplete economic prosperity. In 
other words, defense requirements are closely related to the future capabilities of 
adversaries. However, the problem is that the measurement of defense capability is not as 
clear as the objectives of a national defense. Therefore, the defense structure will be 
disaggregated for the analysis in the following chapters. 
Turkey is located in the center of three problematic regions of the world: the 
Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East. Neighboring countries, except for Greece, 
are either in a transition to democracy or still under some kind of autocratic rule. 
Moreover, the southern neighbors of Iran, Syria and Iraq, are known as supporters of 
state-sponsored terrorism. Any perceived weakness in the eyes of these countries would 
endanger Turkey's security of its southern borders. The relatively stable position of the 
northeastern neighbors cannot be long lasting if Russian democracy fails, and if they 
follow pre-cold war expansionist foreign policy. On the western part, the Balkans are a 
time bomb ready to explode. In this problematic environment, Turkey faces two options. 
One is to engage in an alliance with the European Union and to continue strong relations 
with the United States. The second is to have a strong defense capable of deterring any 
aggression in the absence of support by the allies. Especially after the Cold War, the 
United States' reluctance to give more support and the deterioration of NATO's 
willingness, left Turkey alone in the region. The strategy of the defense establishment 
would reveal the optimum force structure and size. When evaluating the geostrategic 
position of Turkey, Turkey does face a threat directly to its mainland security. Thus, the 
Turkish Armed Forces should be ready to confront a major attack by a regional power 
and to deter a second one from another regional power. The Turkish military should have 
the capability to win one and half aggressions at any time. The definition of deterrence is 
"to hinder or prevent action by fear or consequence or by difficulty and risk."1 Taylor 
argues that deterrence is a psychological phenomenon. A country must convince 
opponents that attempts to gain their objectives would cost more than it would be worth. 
Deterrence is the result of three factors: 
• Capability: relative balance of quality and quantity of weapon systems and 
units relative to those of one's adversary 
• The willingness of personal to operate and fire weapons. (Morale and 
operational readiness) 
• Credibility of the country in its policies.2 
Readiness to fight is closely related to equipment, maintenance, framing, supply 
and mobility of the units. However, it would not be wrong to say that manpower issues 
dominate defense capability. To determine manpower requirements, a bottom-up review 
is necessary. It is obvious that the wartime requirements and peacetime requirements do 
not have to be same. The wartime requirements can be figured out by a scenario analysis. 
The scenario analysis provides: 
1
 Taylor, William J., U.S. Security Requirements: Missions, Manpower, Readiness, Mobilization, and 
Projection of Forces, in Toward a Consensus on Military Service, Report of the Atlantic Council's Working 
Group on Military Service, Pergamon Press, (1982). 
2
 Ibid, p.64. 
• Mix of units 
• Tactical doctrine 
• Desired firepower 
• Number of combat and combat support units3 
Peacetime requirements would be a product of the desired readiness level and 
budget constraints. 
B.        DEFENSE ORGANIZATION 
The Turkish defense structure consists of three forces closely associated under the 
command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Army is the 
biggest in size and its budget is traditionally larger. This is based on the adversary's 
military capabilities and budget constraints on the military. Since labor is cheap relative 
to capital, more emphasis is placed on the Army. However, an analysis of recent wars 
would show that the Air Force is becoming more important. 
Figure 1 shows the defense manpower structure. The manpower system is 
classified as civilian and uniformed personnel at the most aggregate level. Civilian 
personnel are relatively low compared to military personnel. The civilian military 
substitution is one of the areas that needs further analysis. Studies during the transition to 
an all-volunteer force in the United States show that only 20 or 30 percent of active duty 
billets are directly related to combat missions. The remaining positions are required for 
logistic support, aolministration, maintenance and training all of which have counterparts 
in the civilian economy.4 Civilians who cost less can fill these positions without any 
considerable effect on military strength. The negative side of civilian substitution, 
3
 White, John P. and Hosek , James R., The Analysis of Military Manpower Issues in Military Service 
in the United States edited by General Brent Scowcroft, Prentice Hall,(1982),p. 52. 
4
 The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, Collier-Macmillan 
Ltd,(1970),p.44. 
however, is that they cannot be mobilized as easily as uniformed personnel, and they 
demand more compensation for undesirable rotations. "Defense planners should make a 
position by position analysis to decide whether a particular position should be military or 
civilian."5 
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Figure 1. Defense Manpower Systems. 
Source: Richard L.Cooper, "Military Manpower, and the All-Volunteer Force. (Santa 
Monica, California: Rand, 1977), p. 15. 
The main category of the military portion is the officer corps. The strength of the 
military is directly related to the quality of the officer corps. They possess both 
management and leadership responsibility6. The source of the officer corps is the military 
academies of the each service. The college graduates can become support officers only 
but this is also limited. If the college graduates are accepted as combat officers the quality 
of the officer corps would increase because the eligible pool increases. In the current 
structure, there is selection for the military academies only. After entering an academy a 
person would most likely become an officer. To summarize, according to basic economic 
5
 Ibid, p. 36. 
6
 Cooper, p. 15 
rule, competition would bring more efficiency to the services. The termination of the 
draft does not affect the manning of the officer corps when compared to countries where 
the draft is a major source of career personnel. 
The compensation for the officer corps is designed according to rank. Except for 
some cash allowances for pilots, considerable compensation benefits do not exist for the 
specialized officers or for the most difficult jobs. For example, a combat officer, such as 
infantry, has to work in a difficult job environment and is responsible for maintaining the 
mission readiness of the unit, while dealing with the psychological and physical 
challenges of the job. On the other hand, a support officer performs the job in a safe and 
peaceful environment. However, both officers are compensated equally. In fact, the 
equity within the ranks results in an inequity between combat officers and non-combat 
officers. 
Although military personnel have in kind allowances and tax advantages, they are 
not as effective as cash allowances. For example, free housing is available for a limited 
number of personnel. The personnel who are not living in government houses do not 
receive any compensation. Other establishments such as morale camps7 are heavily used 
by senior officers. The bulk of the officers have little chance to use them. There is no law 
that prevents the use of these establishments but since rank is the first determinant, 
practically no junior personnel can use them. Thus, non-cash benefits are not the most 
effective form of compensation for a large part of the defense. Providing cash benefits 
7
 Morale camps are the military hotels in the coastal cities that only military personnel can use. They 
are very advantageous in that the government subsidizes them. 
instead will enable the personnel to decide how to use it in the optimum way8. Finally, 
regular military compensation (RMC), which includes basic payment and compensation 
in kind, is lower than the wages of civilian counterparts. Civilian earning opportunities 
encourage personnel to leave as soon as they complete the mandatory service time and 
acquire the initial retirement benefits. 
The major part of the defense manpower system is enlisted personnel. It is this 
labor force that the draft or the AVF will mainly affect. In the draft system, enlisted 
personnel are drafted from the male population at the age of 20. The draftees are not very 
well paid and are required to serve 18 months. The inefficiencies associated with the draft 
are a result of the government's intervention in the market. The findings of economists 
show that whenever there is an intervention in the markets, a social loss, called 
"deadweight loss", will occur. The draft is no exception. Every young male is obligated 
to serve. Otherwise, he faces legal punishment, and the chances of finding a job are 
almost nonexistent if he fails to serve. The college graduates are drafted as second 
Lieutenants for 18 months. They are substituted for regular officers who graduated from 
the academies. However, since they are not trained sufficiently, the military's return on 
this investment is very low. The Gates commission states that: 
Conscription induces the military services to use manpower inefficiently. 
They make manpower decisions on the basis of the costs they perceive 
them, namely, those that are reflected in their budget. Because budget 
expenses significantly understate the cost of first-term servicemen, the 
services are led to use more of them than they otherwise would. When 
military compensation is raised to a level consistent with an all-volunteer 
armed force, the services will find it desirable to economize on manpower. 
In particular, they will discover ways to substitute non-human resources 
for manpower in a wide variety of activities. They will find it desirable to 
8
 The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, p. 62. 
6 
mechanize tasks now performed manually, and to emphasize, even more 
than at present, durability, reliability, and ease of maintenance in the 
design of equipment and vehicles and in the construction of facilities.9 
As Cooper noted, to better understand the effect of alternatives to the draft, the 
focus should be on other defense inputs as well as military personnel. "The variety of 
resources contribute to the defense mission and can, in many cases, be substituted for one 
another."10 
As seen in Figure 2, inputs to the defense mission can be categorized as labor and 
capital. The substitution of labor versus capital shows the defense organization's 
capabilities and structure. Generally, in the forces that have offensive capability, the 









Figure 2. Defense Resources. 
Source: Richard L. Cooper, "Military Manpower, and the All-Volunteer Force. 
(Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1977), p. 10. 
C.        SYSTEM APPROACH TO DEFENSE ORGANIZATION 
It can be assumed that a defense organization is an open system. Nadler and 
Tushman define a system "as a set of interrelated elements-that is, a change in one 
9
 Ibid, p. 30. 
10
 Cooper, p. 12. 
element affects other elements. An open system is one with its environment."1! A defense 
organization receives inputs from the environment and transforms this input into defense 
capability. Gelhausen offered a congruence model for defense organizations in his thesis. 
Basically a congruence model says "Other things being equal, the greater the total degree 
of congruence or fit between the various components, the more effective will be the 
organization."12 In other words, the defense organization is a set of inputs. Manpower is 
only one of the inputs. The relationship among the inputs provide a model for the defense 
mission. 
D.        SUMMARY 
One of the responsibilities of the states is to provide a safe security environment 
for its members. To achieve this goal, national resources must be used wisely. Security is 
a two-edged sword. It can drain the nation's prosperity, as in the case of the former 
Soviet Union, or it can serve to protect the nation's interests. With the advent of scientific 
management in the 20th century, every sector adapts new management skills to maximize 
their benefits. The ultimate goal of the private sector is to maximize profit. In many 
sectors the main objective is to minimize the cost. However, in the defense sector, no 
criteria to measure the best defense exists. 
1
' Nadler, David A. and Tushman Michael L., Organization, Congruence and Effectiveness. 
12Ibid,p.l01 
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Figure 3. Congruence Approach to Defense. 
The draft versus an all-voluntary force has been discussed in many countries since 
the end of World War LT. The draft system is credited for its low budget costs. However, 
it is not often acknowledged that the draft system has more hidden costs that can offset 
any benefit. These hidden costs generally are a type of tax. The difference between the 
amount a person is earning in a civilian job and when drafted is a kind of tax which will 
be analyzed in Chapter LT in more detail. This has never been shown in budgetary 
expenditures. Technological developments make it sensible for the forces to substitute 
capital for labor. Most of the new weapon systems require not less but more qualified 
9 
personnel. Countries end up with a small sized force by not losing any efficiency because 
of high quality personnel. 
In addition to the tax, there are other social costs associated with the draft system. 
Conscription greatly disrupts a person's life. When considering that nearly 40 percent of 
the Turkish work force is still working in agriculture, the absence of a man would 
undermine many a family's life. Increasingly, many people are searching for ways to 
avoid service. In some cases, they damage themselves physically, such as by cutting their 
fingers, and in some cases by bribing government officials. In the last twenty years, the 
public has learned that many rich people, or those who are related to officials, do not 
serve. Therefore, this sacred military service loses credibility in the public eye. 
The aim of this study is not to support any kind of military system. Rather, it is to 
find out whether an all-volunteer force (AVF) would be an alternative to conscription by 
analyzing the current defense organization in Turkey and using the American experience 
on an AW. This study is more about cost-benefit analysis. However, it is also a fact that 
any manpower system has political and social dimensions as well as economic ones.13 
The main focus would be to answer what consequences "the wrong man in uniform" has 
on a nation's defense capability and resources. 
A country's geopolitical position is a good indicator of its military systems. 
Cohen states that, although rough, ".. .perhaps the best predictors of a country's system of 
military service are the length of its land borders with potentially hostile neighbors and 
the size of its population relative to that of its neighbors...."14. Although, many studies 
13
 Clausewitz says that "war is a continuation of politics by other means" in his classical book. 
14
 Cohen, Eliot A., Citizens and Soldiers, Cornell University Press, (1985), p. 25. 
10 
have found that there is little correlation between a country's economic wealth and its 
reliance on conscription, the successful implementation of an AVF depends on the 
amount of resources a country is willing to devote to its defense.15 
Turkey successfully stopped terrorist activities in the southeastern part of the 
country. Now it is time to evaluate the costs and benefits of the current force structure. 
Every country has reorganized its defense formation after the end of Cold War. The 
decision to use an AVF should be based on scientific research, which would disclose the 
"defense holes" even if the current structure continues to be used. 
To summarize, the defense department is the major budget expenditure and 
employer in the country. Any change in manpower system will have consequences 
beyond the defense. 
15
 Eliot Cohen and Haitiner support this hypothesis in their studies. 
11 
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II.      THE ANALYSIS OF DRAFT SYSTEM 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
Policy makers have to maximize defense capability within a given cost constraint 
while establishing a national defense. If the threat level in the geostrategic arena 
decreases, the defense planners should lower the defense costs. The cost of national 
defense can be better understood by considering how many resources are devoted to the 
military. 
The criteria need to be agreed upon in order to measure the cost of defense 
manpower. From the government point of view, manpower costs are the costs spent by 
the treasury to maintain a certain level of defense, or implicitly what the taxpayers pay. 
This narrow definition is also called budget costs or expenditure. However, a more 
accurate measurement is what society pays, or in other words, what it forgoes when its 
productive labor is employed by the military. The second approach is called opportunity 
cost of military labor to the society. The opportunity cost generally matches budget costs 
in the civilian sector. However, when the government pays labor less than the value of it, 
the difference between budget costs and the cost to society becomes important. Budget 
costs will increase if there is an increase in the portion of the eligible pool required to 
serve. The opportunity cost of military manpower will be called economic cost and is 
analyzed further in this chapter. 
In addition, the cost issue is beyond budget and economic costs. The draft forces a 
proportion of the society to give up their earnings in favor of the government. In a sense, 
an individual's foregone income is a hidden tax which can be called a conscription tax. 
13 
Therefore, when analyzing the draft, the question to be asked is "whether the cost of our 
defense should be paid for by taxpayers in general or whether that cost should be 
imposed disproportionately on a small group of young people, particularly young men".16 
B.        BUDGET COSTS 
A simple calculation for budget costs is to multiply the average rate paid by the 
number of manpower. Budget costs would be lower in the draft system. In an AVF, the 
wage must be equal to the supply price of the last volunteer. In Figure 4, the area under 
wl is the budget cost. It is clear that when the all the eligible pool has to serve, the budget 
costs would exceed the economic costs in an AVF. However, as the proportion of the 
eligible pool to serve decreases, the budget costs would decrease relative to the economic 
costs. The difference between the military wage and the supply curve is the economic 
rent to the suppliers. Then, the issue of cost becomes a procurement policy. How much 
economic rent would be acceptable to transfer from the public to the 
suppliers? 17However, the budget costs would be less than it appears because some of the 
economic rent will return to the government as income taxes collected from the military 
personnel. As the income of military personnel increases so do the income taxes they 
have to pay. Cooper claims "conscription is the standard method of manpower 
procurement when a country maintains a very large military force relative to its 
population."18 
16
 Henderson, David R., The Draft Versus the All Volunteer force, Naval Postgraduate School 
publication, (1988). 
17
 Cooper, p. 83. 
18
 Ibid, p. 93. 
14 
C.       ECONOMIC COST 
Economic cost can be interpreted as the opportunity cost to the person. Civilian 
earnings, including all monetary and nonmonetary earnings, are the opportunity cost. The 
individual's supply price is a good measure which combines the individual's civilian 





Proportion of eligible pool 
Figure 4. Economic Cost of Military Manpower. 
Assume that military manpower requirements is B. If the military pays a wage of 
wl then voluntary individuals will fill all the requirements. However, when the military 
wage is below the wl, say w2, only the Sa portion of the supply curve would voluntarily 
join the military. The remaining accession requirements are filled by individuals who are 
19
 Ibid, p. 69. 
15 
drafted. In the case of Turkey, military wage is nearly equal to zero. Therefore, the area 
below the supply curve is the economic cost of the draft system. 
As the population increases or the manpower requirements decrease, the 
accession requirements will be less than the eligible pool. In Figure 5, the least cost can 
be achieved only if those who have the lowest supply price are drafted first. This is the Sb 
portion of the supply curve. However, this system would be rejected as being unfair. 
Thus, a selection system would be used, as some individuals from the bSl portion of the 
supply curve would also be drafted. As a result, the economic cost of the draft would be 
higher unless the accession requirement is reduced. 
Unlike the United States, where those on the upper portion of the supply curve 
would more be unlikely to serve because of the government's deferment policies to the 
students, fathers and others20, in Turkey the practical economic cost is the same as the 
figure suggests because no exception to the draft policy exists. 
D.       LABOR UTILIZATION 
The previous discussion shows that budget costs are less than the economic costs 
of the draft. As Cooper noted, this leads to over employment of labor during the draft.21 
In the absence of the draft, the military would have to pay the economic costs to enlist 
personnel. When the price increases, the quantity demanded decreases. It can thus be 
stated that the military's demand for personnel is a downward sloping function. The cost 
of over employment can be calculated by Figure 6. 
20
 Ibid, p. 73. 
21




Proportion of the eligible pool 
Figure 5. Measuring the Economic Cost When Eligible Pool Exceeds Accession 
Requirements. 
wage 
Proportion of eligible pool 
Figure 6. Over Employment Cost of the Draft. 
17 
The optimum defense level is the intersection of supply and demand curves. At 
this point, there is no deadweight loss. Social gain at the market price is the sum of areas 
A and B. Nevertheless, when military payment is insignificant then the social gain will be 
reduced by the amount of C+D. 
As labor becomes more expensive, the quantity of labor demanded diminishes 
because of the income and substitution effect. To quote Cooper: 
Substitution effect is that as manpower becomes more expensive relative 
to other inputs to the defense mission, the military will substitute less 
expensive inputs, so that the overall demand for manpower will be 
reduced....The income effect is that as manpower becomes more 
expensive, other things being equal, it becomes more expensive to 
maintain a given level of national defense relative to other uses of 
society's resources, so that less defense-hence less manpower - will be 
demanded.22 
The classic 105 mm artillery team can be an example of overmanning and an 
ineffective usage of labor in defense establishments. The team normally consists of seven 
persons. However, as many artillery officers know, four experienced soldiers do better 
than seven draftees. Many high-ranking officers would challenge this claim by proposing 
that there is actually a shortage of manpower rather than overmanning. However, the fact 
is that their understanding of the shortage is based on the current overmanned categories. 
For example, in almost every sector of the military, there is a person whose job it is only 
to make tea and there is another one to serve the tea. The absence of these two people for 
this occupation does not necessarily mean a shortage of labor exists, although these 
occupations are always filled. Further analyses of the effectiveness of each job would 
22
 Ibid, p. 74. 
18 
show that a significant amount of active forces are not involved in the necessary military 
training. 
E.        TURNOVER COSTS 
Personnel turnover is inversely related to length of service. The draft system 
inherently has less time served than an AVF. There are three cost items derived from 
higher turnover rates 
• As the turnover rate increases, so does training costs: basic military 
training, the cost of extra ammunition, medical expenses, intelligence 
expenses, paperwork expenses, the costs related with disciplinary 
problems 
• A higher turnover rate means more trainers and trainee time per year. 
• The draftees generally are ineffective in the first three months in their 
active duty positions. On the job training (OJT) consists of a considerable 
amount of training. Thus, as the turnover rate increases the more 
inexperienced soldiers would receive OJT. 
The irony is that as the population increases to continue the universal draft, 
Turkey has to reduce the service time that, as shown above, would reduce the 
effectiveness of the military. 
Permanent separations at the end of someone's service require new accessions in 
order to maintain the strength of the armed forces. However, new accessions must be 
trained before being fully productive to the military. Training includes formal draft 
training and on the job training .The first is given at the training posts for three months. 
At the end of this formal training, an individual is assigned to an operating unit to 
continue training on the job for an average of three more months, which changes 
depending on the profession, education level and job requirements. By assuming that a 
draftee is 100 percent effective at the end of two years, and effectiveness increases over 
19 




Months in Service 
Figure 7. Draft Productivity. 
The negative area is the training costs incurred (formal and OJT training costs) 
until the end of the sixth month. Since all of the draftees separate at the end of eighteen 
months, the training costs should be included in the budget costs while evaluating an 
AVF alternative. When retention increases, the training costs will drop enormously. 
F. CONSCRIPTION TAX 
Conscription is a tax young males have to endure. It does not appear in any 
government revenue and expense plans. The conscription tax is the difference between 
the individuals' military wage and the wage desired to join the military voluntarily (the 
23
 Adopted from the study made by Syllogistics Inc., The Differential Budget Costs of Conscription- 
Based Alternatives to the All-Volunteer Force, 1986, pp. 4-19. 
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supply price). The supply price includes civilian wages and the price of one's attitude 
towards the military. A proclivity to take risk will reduce the supply price and not liking 
military life will increase the supply price. Many people may not like being disciplined, 
or living in the barracks, or authoritarian rules. Cooper states that the conscription tax is a 
means of income redistribution. The redistribution is a result of only a percentage of 
young male individuals having to serve. There are two dimensions associated with this 
fact. The first is its intergenerational transfers of income and the second is 
intragenerational transfers of income.24 The intragenerational transfer happens because 
only the young male population has to serve. Since the entire male population has to 
serve, this kind of transfer may be justified. However, the draft excludes women. The 
inequity of the draft in favor of women is obvious. 
The most problematic form of income redistribution is intergenerational 
redistribution. While those who are selected to serve will carry the tax, others will avoid 
it. The selection process is important as well. If a random selection is used then those 
who are at the upper portion of the supply curve, or in other words, those whose civilian 
earnings are much higher will have to pay more taxes compared to the lower groups. To 
illustrate this, consider two individuals A's yearly civilian earnings are $5000 and B's 
$2000. Since the military pays no wages to draftees, A will forgo $5000 while B forgoes 
only $2000. The previous statement is not true in real life however. The higher a person's 
reservation wage, the more activities done to avoid the service. Thus, only a small ratio of 
the high reservation wage group will serve. There is an irony here that, on the one hand, 
this reduces the conscription tax, on the other hand, it causes other problems. Social 
24
 Ibid. p. 86. 
21 
justice and the morale of draftees is disrupted when many of the rich people or those who 
have ties with effective interest groups do not serve. For instance, one of the famous pop 
singers in Turkey has avoided being drafted even at the expense of living abroad. If 
drafted, his civilian earnings would be lost to him and to society as a deadweight loss. 
However, as long as he avoids service, society judges him a traitor. Since high income 
members are unlikely to pay and low income members pay less, the middle class 
members pay most of the taxes disproportionately. In other words, the draft redistributes 
the income from poorer to wealthier.25 
The previous definition of the conscription tax does not include the economic rent 
foregone and the cost of collecting the conscription tax.26 If the government pays the 
market price to attract volunteers, it would have given the supply price of the last 
volunteer in the supply curve. The lower group will earn a rent equal to the difference 
between their supply prices and military wages. When conscription is used, this rent 
would be lost. As an example, assume the government pays $5000 and can fill its 
manpower requirements with this amount. If A's supply price is $2000 and B's is $5000, 
then A will earn a rent of $3000 while the latter earns zero. 
25
 Ibid, p. 89. 
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Figure 8. Conscription Tax. 
The civilian economy is deprived of its human resources as a result of the draft. 
Young educated people are not effectively used. Due to the overmanning effect of 
conscription, it is easy to discover an electric engineer serving as a tea server in the 
military. One extreme example is that in previous years, one Harvard graduated person 
died during operations against a terrorist organization. Like, the pop singer, this Harvard 
man would definitely have served his country, better in the civilian economy rather than 
being forced to serve in the military. 
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By borrowing the formulas from the studies prepared for the president's 
commission on AVF, a model for conscription tax will be constructed. Assume that 
individuals try to maximize their expected income (y*)27. 
Then their expected income will be the sum of 
• The probability of not serving times their supply price less the cost to 
avoid the draft 
• And the probability of having to serve times military wages less the cost 
they incurred to avoid the draft 
y*=(l-p)(w-c)+p(l-c) (1) 
where 
p = the probability of serving 
w = supply price(equal to the alternative civilian earnings) 
c = the costs incurred to avoid being drafted 
The military wage is equal to unity for simplicity in the calculations. 
If the equation is rearranged, then 
y*=w-c-pw + p (2) 
An individual can change the expected income by controlling c. Thus, y is a 
function of c. P is also related to c, since the probability of being drafted depends on the 
cost one is willing to incur.28 
By differentiating y* with respect to c, the optimum income can be calculated for 
the individual whose supply price is higher than the military wage. 
27
 Ibid, Ch. 4, pp. 1-7. 
28
 Cooper, p. 97. 
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^ = ^d_w)_l (3) 
de     de 
Making the equation equal zero: 
dp       1 
dc    l-w 
(4) 
A plausible functional form for p(c) is29: 
p=e-ßc,ß>0 (5) 
where ß equals a variable controlled by the government that can affect the degree of 
success for an individual who incurs draft avoidance costs. Therefore, if the government 
allows more draft deferments then ß would be larger. Using Equation 5 
&=.ße-*=-ßp (6) 
de 
by incorporating Equation 6 with Equation 4: 
1 (7) ß(w-\) 
This condition cannot be satisfied for w<(l+ß)/ß since it would cause p>l. From 
Sjaastad and Hansen30 
The appropriate interpretation of cases where Equation 7 implies p>l is 
that of a corner solution; persons who cannot satisfy condition Equation 7 
are those for whom the gains associated with reducing the probability of 
induction are so small that no expenditure to do is justified. These persons 
will simply permit themselves to become drafted, or they may even 
volunteer but they would not do so in the absence of conscription. 
Individuals able to satisfy Equation 7 enter the military only as draftees. 
By making p equal to 1, the following is obtained: 
29
 Offered by Sjaastad and Hansen in the study prepared for The President's Commission on AVF 
30
 Studies prepared for The President's Commission on an AVF volume II, Ch. 4, pp. 1-7. 
25 
w* = 1+1/ß (8) 
The above equation reveals that the individual whose supply price is above w*, or 
those on the supply curve above point A, would engage in avoiding the draft and would 
join the military as a draftee only if it was not possible to avoid being drafted. 
Individuals up to point A in Figure 9 are either true volunteers who like military 
life and join the military even if the military pay is significant, or draft-motivated 




Eligible Manpower Pool 
Figure 9. Conscription Tax. 
In the previous figure, ABC is the conscription tax in a narrow sense. A truer 
conscription tax will include the foregone rent (ACD) and cost of collecting the 
conscription tax (ABEF). 
The avoidance costs spent by any individual can be defined by making Equation 5 
equal to Equation 7 
p=e ß(w-l) if the equation is rewritten e 
mc
 =ß(w-l)   for w>w* 
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By taking logarithms 
c = — [ln/? + ln(w-l)] (9) 
Total costs incurred to avoid the draft are: 
Costs = from So to 1 integral c [w(s)] d(s) where w(s) is the supply price 
G.       MANPOWER MANAGEMENT 
In a draft system, one key goal is to preserve equity among the draftees. There is 
no compensation between a highly skilled productive draftee and an ineffective one. The 
lack of compensation often discourages skilled labor from undertaking additional 
responsibilities and generally, there is a tendency to avoid the work. From the viewpoint 
of a draftee, happiness occurs when avoiding performing a given duty, or doing it with 
less effort, since nothing is received for what is done and there is no difference between 
being successful or not being successful. Even worse, being successful means that new 
duties will be assigned. Draftees perceive that they do not contribute to the goals of the 
defense organization. The gap between the goals of a draftee and the defense organization 
is so wide that often supervision is required to accomplish the defense mission. The goal 
of a draftee is to complete the term as soon as possible with the least effort while the 
organization's goal is to achieve a certain level of defense by using its inputs. It would 
not be an exaggeration to call this problem unavoidable draft illness. The result of draft 
illness is too costly. Many equipment maintenance and mental costs can be traced back to 
the lack interest by an individual. 
Another problem that the draft causes is the inefficiency in the use of labor. The 
military commanders often do not consider management principles because of cheap and 
ever ready labor. Defense can be separated into two broad categories of capital and labor. 
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When the relative price of labor to capital increases, capital must be substituted for labor. 
However, since the actual cost of labor is not reflected in a draft environment, the capital 
labor ratio does not change. If the cost of labor were reflected, the amount of capital used 
would increase and an effective use of labor would ensue. 
H.        QUALITY OF ENLISTEES 
There is a high correlation between personnel quality and defense outcome. In a 
study carried out during the Korean conflict, it has been noted that "successful fighters 
tended to be more intelligent, healthier, more socially mature and emotionally stable, and 
more rapid and accurate in performing manual and physical tasks. Conversely, those who 
were low in intelligence tended to make poor fighters."31 Advanced weaponry systems 
demand high quality operators in today's warfare. The infantryman approach of the past 
is no longer valid. In the battlefield, as seen in the last Gulf War, a small team or a unique 
weapon system may have an operational capability. Quality consists of mental capability, 
attitude and morale, and experience. However, to measure the quality, quantitative data is 
needed. One way is to establish a qualification test to categorize the personnel according 
to mental capabilities. The current structure of the Armed Forces categorizes the draftees 
according to education level, but research shows that qualification tests are more 
significantly related to skill abilities than to education level.32 The experience level of 
personnel will evidently be higher in a volunteer army. Although it is not justified, it can 
be proposed that a draftee cannot be fully experienced and effective even at the end of 
31
 Egbert, Robert L., T. Meeland, V. B. Clive, E. W. Forgy, M. W. Spickler, and C. Brown, 
Fighterl:An Analysis of Combat Fighters and Non Fighters, HumRRO Tech. Report 44 (Washington D.C. 
1957) in Marlowe, David H., The Manning of the Force: The AVF and the Draft. 
32
 Marlowe, David H., The Manning of the Force: The AVF and the Draft in Conscripts and 
Volunteers, Rowman & Allanheld Publishers, (1983). 
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eighteen months. Four years or longer will fully exploit personnel abilities. However, this 
cannot be applied in a draft, because no one would serve for such a long period. 
I. READINESS OF FORCES 
The term readiness means "the ability of forces, units, weapons systems, and 
equipment to deliver the outputs for which they were designed"33 Implicitly, readiness is 
to have the capability to engage in a military action including the deployment of forces in 
a reasonable amount of time that will be able to protect national interests. Readiness has 
its own cost. In peacetime, unnecessary mobilization of forces will exhaust national 
resources. Therefore, there must be a downsizing of the military in a post-cold war world 
situation. A Total Force Policy would be a good start in evaluating the readiness of the 
military. Defense capability should be measured in terms of not only active forces but 
also reserve, civilian and allied forces.34 Active forces are considered to have the highest 
readiness. Thus, the problem involves the readiness of reserve forces. The mobilization of 
reserve forces depends on three factors:35 
• Missions: The difficulty of the mission determines the preparation time for 
the reserves 
• Wartime Performance Objectives: Higher proficiency goals require more 
preparation. 
• Peacetime Activities and Resources: The degree of peacetime training and 
availability of training units affect mobilization 
The Turkish military sustains a relatively high amount of active forces due to the 
problems in Cyprus and terrorism. Because terrorism was stopped by the successful 
operations of the military, a downsizing of active forces will not risk much of a loss in 
33
 Went, Joseph J., The Readiness Challenge, in Professionals on the Front Line edited by J. Eric 
Fredland, C. L. Gilroy, R -L .Little, and W. S. Sellman, Brassey's (Washington, 1996). 
34
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national defense. A recent paper reveals that, although throughout history, the accession 
requirements of the armed forces were hardly achieved, the increase in the eligible pool, 
as a result of an increase in the population, provided enough manpower. However, the 
policy of the draft for the entire eligible pool continues. Sixty thousand draftees were 
assigned each year in addition to the accession requirements. 
Training and maintaining the operability of equipment can increase the readiness 
of the active forces. In the current system, the availability of training units and the 
draftee's desire to learn military skills is less because these skills will most probably not 
be used in the civilian world. 
J. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter focused on the models for the costs of the draft.. As the models 
show, economic costs would be significantly higher for conscription. Early American 
studies found that a transition to an AVF might result in cost savings which is contrary to 
the common point of view. Traditional values, such as commitment to duty, honor and 
country, do not necessarily justify the conscription. The AVF is widely criticized for 
being seen as a mercenary force. However, the AVF experience in many countries has 
proven the military is joined both because of financial incentives and a perception of the 
aforementioned values. 
New technology and population growth is a negative factor for the draft. To quote 
Gelhausen, "the introduction of advanced weapon systems would lead to sufficient 
substitution of capital for labor, enabling a given task to be performed with fewer and 
30 
less-skilled people."36 While an increase in population will reduce the ratio of those 
conscripted into the eligible pool, this causes social unfairness against draftees. 
In addition to the economic costs, the quality pillar of manpower favors an AVF. 
As Cooper noted, "the relative contribution of any given individual to defense is a 
function of his experience..."37 Under this assumption, by relying on more experienced 
personnel, the military can reduce total force size while maintaining capability. 
36
 Gelhausen, Volker, The Effects of Economic, Military, Political and Social Factors on the 
Successful Implementation of an AVF, Naval Postgraduate School (1998), p. 60. 
37
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III.    ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
An alternative to conscription is to fill all the accession requirements with 
volunteers. Transition to an all-volunteer force is not merely a military manpower issue; 
it has long-term social and economic consequences. It is not surprising that in the U.S., 
the future of an AVF was debated until the Gulf War. However, using an AVF in a war 
demonstrated its combat effectiveness. 
There are two concerns about an AVF: the cost of sustaining an all-volunteer 
force and whether it would be possible to attract sufficient manpower during a crisis. 
Studies generally favor the AVF on a cost basis. Although budget costs would be higher 
in an AVF, the economic costs are lower depending on the size of the force. The second 
concern requires the effective use of market tools. In an emergency, by increasing the 
level of military compensation, the enlistment rate can be increased. An alternative policy 
is to establish a standby draft. This alternative can be costly in economic terms but it will 
make the budget cost in a crisis lower. 
An increasing population in Turkey may cause an AVF to be used. The ratio of 
accession to an eligible population base is decreasing. Therefore, in the near future, 
Turkey will find itself in a situation where only a small percentage of the population has 
to serve. The deferment policies cannot prevent selected service. As noted before, the fact 
that the draft became increasingly selective led to concern for fairness, which in turn led 
people to favor ending the draft in the U.S. 
In this chapter, the quality, demand, supply and cost of the AVF are analyzed. 
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B.        QUALITY OF ENLISTEES 
The Armed Forces demand more qualified people as military technology becomes 
more complex. A high quality person will learn quickly, will do the job well and will not 
have as many disciplinary problems as a low quality peer. However, the price of the 
former is much higher than of the latter. Measuring quality is not easy. Mental aptitude 
tests are the most commonly used ways to measure quality. The U.S. military uses four 
levels of mental categories. Category I consists of people who score the highest on the 
tests and category IV consists of the lowest group. 
The Gates commission's studies showed that there is some empirical relation 
between trainability, the attrition rate and disciplinary problems of enlistees on the one 
hand and their mental category on the other38. Category IV people require more basic 
training, have a higher attrition rate and cause more disciplinary problems than the other 
groups. On the other hand, job productivity cannot be explained by mental aptitude 
alone. To understand the quality aspect of enlistees, educational attainment should be 
focused on as well. Cooper states that educational level is the decisive factor in 
productivity. A category IV high school graduate is more productive than a non high 
school category I counterpart. 39 Moreover, not all of the jobs require high quality people. 
In some jobs, the use of category IV people is more cost effective. 
The AVF has provided a high quality force that has not been achieved before in 
the U.S. military. More than 90 percent of the enlistees are high school graduates and 60 
38
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39
 Cooper, p. 139. 
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percent scored above average on the mental qualification test.40 In fact, a conscription 
based alternative would end up in low quality category because the overall quality of the 
public is less than the quality of an AVF. 
The demand for high quality personnel is increasing because of the movement 
towards more noncombat areas and effective use of new weapon systems. After World 
War II, a steady change has occurred in the internal structure of the armed forces. While 
combat requirements are contracting, the combat support and combat service support 
functions are expanding.41 The noncombat occupations increasingly demand high quality 
personnel such as computer specialists and electricians. 
There is a high correlation between the quality of personnel and fully exploiting 
new technology. General Depuy provides a useful model to analyze the performance of 
the new weapon systems.42 According to Depuy, system performance (Ps )is the product 
of equipment performance(Pe) and human performance(Ph). 
Thus, 
Ps=Pe*Ph 
In Figure 10, the relationship between Pe and Ph is depicted. 
40
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Figure 10.       Weapon System Performance. 
Source: Depuy, William E., Technology and Manpower: Army Perspective in the 
All-Volunteer Force After a Decade edited by William Bowman, Roger Little and G. 
Thomas Sicilia, Pergamon-Brassey's, (1986) 
Human performance is a driver given that equipment performance is fixed. For 
example, TOW weapon systems require a 90 percent performance "in most of the war 
game simulations." 
Make Pe = 0.90. To achieve Ps=0.90, Ph must be equal to 1. However, even an 
average performance of category I people is below 1. Thus, there is always a performance 
gap that must be exploited. For example if we assume average Ph of category I people 
equal to 0.75 then 
Ps=0.75*0.90=0.675 
There will be 0.225 amount of Ps that can be filled by increasing Ph. If the military 
uses low quality personnel, the gap will be much wider. 
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C.        THE COST OF THE AVF 
The measurement of budget and economic costs is explained in detail in Chapter 
II. To summarize, when evaluating a particular policy budget, costs are generally taken 
into account. However, a more realistic approach requires what society foregoes for that 
particular policy. In other words, the economic costs must be considered in any debate 
about manpower planning. If the cost savings resulting from improved manpower 
utilization in an AVF can be calculated correctly, the cost effectiveness of the AVF 
would be realized. In the U.S. experience, the implementation of an AVF resulted in 
budget savings of $2 billion.43 In addition; a costing effort should include the future costs 
and savings of a program. In other words, it would be misleading only to measure 
incurred costs but not to measure the costs or savings that will be incurred in the future. 
For example, future retirement benefits of the enlistees and savings from training 
activities should be considered. 
The cost items for an AVF can be listed in three categories. The list was originally 
used by the U.S. General Accounting Office to determine the AVF costs by using an 
incremental approach:44 
1.        Premilitary Service Costs 




 Cooper, p. 258. 
44
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37 
(b)       Enlistments 
(1) Incentives: Nonmonetary and bonuses 
(2) Length of Service related costs 
(3) Enlistment Standard related costs 
2.         Military Service Costs 
(a) Compensation and Benefits 
(1) Basic Pay 
(2) Monetary incentives and bonuses 
(3) Tax advantages and privileges 
(4) Health care costs 
(b) Development 
(1) Training and education related costs 
(2) Attrition costs 
(3) Assignment costs 
(4) Civilian Substitution for military personnel 
(c) Management 
(1)       Living Conditions: Bachelor and family housing 
3.        Postmilitary Service Costs 
(a) Retirement pay 
(b) Separation pay 
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(c) Health benefits 
(d) Privileges 
D.        RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN AN AVF 
Resource allocation is the distribution of defense resources such as equipment and 
manpower among the various defense missions. The allocation of these resources can be 
in a variety of forms. Each combination has costs associated with its use.45 Defense 
planners should find the most cost-effective alternative. 
Cooper states "the optimum allocation of military resources among specific inputs 
is then a function of the relative costs of these inputs."46 Considering labor and capital as 
the main inputs to defense missions, a two-factor production function of labor and capital 
can be written. 
Q=f(Ki,L0 (10) 
Where q = amount of defense output 
K = amount of capital in the i * mission 
L = amount of labor in the i* mission 
As the above formula shows, many alternatives can yield the same defense output. 
When the budget constraint is included in the model, the optimum allocation of the 
resources is found. 
C=PK*K+PL*L (11) 
Where C = the cost of the mission 
45
 Cooper, p. 269. 
46
 Cooper, p. 277. 
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PK = the price of capital 
PL = the price of labor 
Optimum allocation of the resources would occur when the marginal products of 
the labor and capital are equal to the ratio of their costs. 
MPL _ PL 
MP~K~TK 
(12) 
The ratio of marginal products is also called the technical rate of substitution of 
capital for labor. Marginal products are a decreasing function of the amount of labor and 
capital. In other words, as the amount of capital (labor) increases (decreases) the marginal 
product of capital (labor) decreases (increases). Thus, if the relative cost of labor 
increases, the budget line will shift from Bi to B2 which results in an increase in the use 
of capital. Figure 11 depicts the relationship between the budget line and isoquant (Q). 
Figure 11.       The Military Production Function. 
In an all-volunteer environment, the relative cost of labor to capital increases. 
Thus, the military should search for opportunities to  substitute capital for labor. 
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on 
Especially in the labor-intensive sections, such as administration and support areas, this 
substitution will result in huge cost savings. 
E.        CIVILIAN SUBSTITUTION 
Defense organization can reduce manpower costs by substituting civilian labor for 
military personnel in many occupations. The underlying assumption is that civilian 
personnel are less costly than their military counterparts. The military accepts unskilled 
personnel from a limited age group, and after extensive training, these personnel can be 
used effectively. Thus, entry to the system occurs at the bottom level. Without allowing 
lateral input, the military draws its career personnel from inside the system. The training 
and development costs of unskilled personnel are not relevant for civilians. Those costs 
are under their direct responsibility. The military can find optimal civilians in a market 
environment. Some researchers believe that the productivity of civilians is higher than 
that of military personnel since military personnel often have to spend some time doing 
military related duties that are not directly related to the position assignment.47 Not all 
studies support the cost effectiveness of civilian substitution.48 In some occupations, 
civilians demand higher compensation than their military counterparts. But in the 
positions where a civilian's productivity is higher than that of a uniformed person, cost 
savings can be incurred by substituting fewer civilians for more military personnel, rather 
than on a one-to-one basis. 
The identification of criteria for substitution is important to maintain the readiness 
of the forces. The following occupations belong to uniformed personnel: 
47
 Albro, Ames S., Civilian Substitution, in the Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on an 
All-Volunteer Armed Force. 
48
 Cooper, p. 296. 
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• Combat related occupations 
• Positions that require military personnel because of the skills involved 
• Command and control elements 
• Positions that require frequent service rotations, such as assignment to 
undesirable regions 
Civilians can fill the remaining occupations. However, some constraints on 
civilian manpower, such as mobilization, can offset the gains by a "man-for-man" 
substitution. Civilianization includes direct hire or contract hires. Although the cost 
savings from the use of direct hires is not clear, the use of contract hires will result in 
greater cost savings because "the civilian contractors can take advantage of local labor 
market conditions."49 
F.        SUMMARY 
The success of the AVF is closely related to military manpower policies. The 
following areas can reduce the burden on the budget: 
Relaxation of the standards for physical and mental capabilities when 
necessary. Low standard enlistees can fill some occupations. 
The use of women when possible 
The use of civilians in noncombat positions 
Improvement to retention/reenlistment management. 
Establishing   a  variety  of enlistment  and  reenlistment  periods   and 
options.50 
More cost savings in an AVF will be realized from the substitution of civilians for 
military personnel, capital for labor and career personnel for junior personnel. 
49
 Cooper, p. 301. 
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IV.    CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT AN AVF 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
The lack of civilian interests in the military limits the study of an AVF in Turkey. 
Civilians generally feel that military personnel can better solve military issues. However, 
in today's environment, every agency needs independent studies that will help to find the 
most efficient policies. The objections to a particular military policy should not be 
understood as threatening to national security. In the absence of scientific analysis, 
nobody can evaluate the outcome of a particular policy. The civilian and military officials 
should encourage the universities, research agencies, and academicians to study national 
defense. 
From personnel interviews at Turkish military headquarters, this researcher 
concluded that senior officers favored an AVF. Turkish military personnel see the AVF 
as a professional armed force. However, as explained in previous chapters, a professional 
armed force does not mean an AVF or any other military system. The support for an AVF 
in Turkey is not based on a scientific background. Many senior officers claim, simply, 
"An AVF is inevitable in the future for Turkey." 
In this chapter, the objections to an AVF in Turkey and in the countries that have 
already changed its military system from conscription to an AVF and some other 
alternatives to the conscription system will be discussed. 
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B.        ARGUMENTS AGAINST AN AVF 
The objections against an AVF resulted from the unquestioned acceptance of the 
draft system as the best military system rather than from scientific research. For example, 
in one of the studies about the case for the draft, Lacy claims that the only benefit of the 
all-volunteer force in the U.S. has been its avoidance of compulsion in peacetime.51 
Nevertheless, the critics of AVF believe that the losses outweigh the benefits in other 
respects: 
• in security: a defense manpower procurement policy is tied to the whims 
of the labor marketplace 
• in military dependability: at the time of an emergency, many are not 
confident that additional manpower can be provided quickly enough to be 
militarily effective or even usable 
However, none of the above assumptions happened to be true in the U.S. The late 
1970s were the worst years in the recruitment area. Especially the U.S army could not 
meet its accession requirements. The reason was relatively lower military compensation. 
After the pay increases, all services filled their requirements. Furthermore, the public's 
justification for using military force is an important motivation for the individuals to 
enlist. In contrast to World War II, the volunteer enlistments during the Vietnam War 
were very low. Similarly, when the Turkish government explained the importance of 
fighting terrorists, the public saw the fight as a source of pride and dignity. 
Mainly, the objections can be classified into five categories: 
• The mobilization and problem of reserved forces 
• The cost of an AVF 
• The social representation problem 
51
 Lacy, James L., The Case for Conscription, in Military Service in the United States, edited by 
General Brent Scowcroft, Prentice Hall, (1982). 
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• An AVF would be a mercenary force 
• Civilian respect will erode 
1. Reserve Forces 
A detailed analysis of the reserved forces under an AVF is beyond the scope of 
this study. The reserved forces are used to supplement the active force's combat losses 
and to meet the personnel requirements of the military in a national emergency. Under 
the current system, the draftees are obliged to be on call until the age of 40. The reserves 
attend two weeks of active duty training each year. The underlying assumption is that the 
draft supplies trained personnel to the military in an emergency. So, short training times 
will be enough to refresh the knowledge of the personnel. However, the validity of the 
above assumption has not yet been tested. 
There are two alternatives to the current reserve structure under an AVF .The first 
is to draft civilians who are not active duty. The second is to recruit voluntarily. The first 
alternative is mandatory service for civilians. Those who complete their service can be 
obligated to serve for a certain period in the reserved forces. Prior service personnel are 
valuable because they are already trained and experienced. The first alternative would 
result in a deadweight loss but not as much as a draft would cause. A voluntary reserve 
force's main concern, like active forces, will be filling its accession requirements in a 
competitive market. The survivability of a voluntary draft depends on prior service 
reenlistments and enlistments from civilians. 
2. The Cost of an AVF 
As mentioned earlier, the visible cost of an AVF force is misleading, since the 
budget cost does not reflect the real social cost of the AVF. Many draft related costs are 
hard to measure. Indiscipline related costs are clearly more costly. The downsizing of 
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active forces is vital to the success of an AVF. The military needs new management 
skills. Moreover, the cost depends on the amount of rent society wants to give to 
enlistees. The selection of measurement criteria can change the outcome. For example, if 
force strength is held constant, an AVF would seem costly. However, the correct 
measurement must be to hold the force effectiveness constant based on the alternatives. A 
study made by Syllogistics Inc. showed that 
...as a method of personnel procurement, an active force draft could be 
quiet costly compared to today's AVF.... Perhaps the greatest advantage 
of the AVF is the economic efficiency that market pricing of labor 
resources imposes on the military.52 
3.        The Social Representation Problem 
The supporters of this argument believe that an AVF would not represent all 
society. More poor people would want to enlist when they see military pay as more 
attractive. Though it is not relevant in Turkey's case, other countries are fearful of having 
enlistees from either minority groups or poor families. The AVF experience in the U.S. 
shows that, although the African-American participation is high compared to their ratio in 
the population, the composition of the force has been similar to the draft, contrary to 
Mosko's argument.53 The decision to enlist depends on the expected income of the 
individuals. Any quota to prevent people from enlisting will result in inefficiencies. 
Considering the fact that high-income individuals would incur draft avoidance costs more 
than others, the socioeconomic composition of an AVF would not be different from a 
draft system. To quote Gates' report: 
52
 The Differential Budget Costs of Conscription-Based Alternatives to the All-Volunteer Force, a 
study made by Syllogistics Inc., (1986), p.5-13 
53
 Charles C. Moskos claimed that".. .the combat arms especially never draw proportionately from the 
middle- and upper-class youth....", Social Considerations of the All-Volunteer Force in Military Service in 
the United States, edited by General Brent Scowcroft, Prentice Hall, (1982). 
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...if higher pay does make opportunities in all-volunteer force more 
attractive to some particular group than those in civilian life, then the 
appropriate course is to correct the discriminations in the civilian life- not 
to introduce additional discriminations against such a group....54 
4. An AVF Decreases Patriotism 
There are no grounds for this argument. The main body of a military force is a 
career force that consists of volunteer personnel. To claim the voluntary army is a 
mercenary force would mean all the officers are mercenary because they are paid. There 
are many reasons to serve in the military. The wage is only one of them. Eliminating the 
financial penalty of the draft will not change the attitudes of people towards the 
military.55 Nevertheless, what these critics forget is that an individual who is 
involuntarily in the military has less incentive than a volunteer to perform his or her duty. 
5. Erosion of Civilian Respect and Isolation of the Military 
All the surveys show that the public puts the Military Forces first when asked 
"which agency do you trust most?". Public opinion is similar in most of the democratic 
countries. People generally think the legislative branch is corrupt and the military is the 
only agency doing the job well. If the military's effectiveness increases as a result of a 
particular policy, the society's esteem for the military would increase more. The real 
danger facing society-military relations is that society sooner or later does not want to 
accept that some people carry the defense burden while others do not. If the population 
growth continues at the current level, Turkey would have to use a selected service if not 
an AVF. The disproportionate distribution of burden under selective service was one of 
the main reasons to end the draft in the U.S. The AVF has nothing to do with the isolation 
of the military from society. The AVF changes the manning system of first timers greatly. 
54
 The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, p. 15. 
55
 Ibid, p. 16. 
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It is the officer corps which affects the level of isolation. The more the officer corps is 
isolated from society, the more the military will be isolated from society. In fact, the 
source of isolation lies in the kind of benefits provided as compensation for military 
personnel. Government housing, commissaries and medical care in military hospitals 
contributes to isolation more than any other factors. However, the elimination of some of 
these in kind benefits may have an adverse effect on the morale of military personnel. In 
general, cash compensation may be a solution to the isolation problem. 
C.       MILITARY SERVICE SYSTEMS 
Understanding the military systems will help develop the best system needed. 
There are two main categories of military systems. The first is conscription-based 
systems and the second is volunteer-based systems. The Universal Military System and 
AVF were explained in the previous chapters. 
1.        Conscription Based Systems 
a.        National Service 
All men are required to serve either in the military or in a government job 
for a certain period of time. This system is aimed at providing fairness in a country where 
not all of the eligible people are required to serve. Advocates of this system say, that 
national service brings fairness to the military, because an individual has the right to 
choose among military and government jobs. Thus, the military can recruit more 
volunteers than a draft system. However, Kester criticized this system for the inherent 
56 wrongs.-1 
It is impractical. It is difficult to employ all the young people in the public 
sector. 
It is costly. The conscription tax and other costs increases in this system. 
5(>
 Kester, John G., The Reasons to Draft, in the All-Volunteer Force After a Decade. 
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b. Selected Service 
The enlistees are chosen within an eligible pool by a lottery method. The 
selected service is a result of the draft system as the entire eligible pool exceeds the 
accession requirements. Only a portion of the eligible pool carries the burden of defense. 
It is this unfairness that compels many countries to look for other alternatives. 
c. Monetary Service and Conscription 
In this system, people who can afford to pay a certain amount of money 
can avoid conscription. The money limit can be adjusted to enable the military to meet its 
manpower requirements. This system lowers the budgetary cost of the conscription. 
However, many people believe that to put a monetary value on military service will 
reduce the military's esteem. Figure 12 shows the cost of a monetary service. 
The area ABEF is revenue for the government and a loss for individuals. 
Thus, the conscription tax decreases by the amount of area ABEF. 
wage 
PE 
Eligible population    s PE    =    the     amount    the 
government     charges     non- 
joiners 
Si = Accession Requirements 
Figure 12.       The Cost of Monetary Military Service. 
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D.        SUMMARY 
Society and military can gain more than they lose if a careful analysis is made 
about the viability of an AVF in Turkey. The Turkish military has always been a 
supporter of a better military. History witnessed the reform actions taken by the Turkish 
military to maintain its power in changing environments. The key success factor for a 
policy change is to guarantee public support. Society's view does not change 
considerably as a result of a new manpower procurement system. The cadre body of the 
military is the same in all systems. Since the structure of the officer corps will almost 
certainly remain the same in an AVF, many of the objections to the AVF can be said to 
be groundless. 
Two of the aforementioned considerations are worth considering: the future of the 
reserved forces and the cost of the AVF. Turkey relies on a large standing active force for 
its security. The manning of the reserved forces in the absence of conscription depends 
on the amount and structure of the reserved forces. The Turkish military should clarify its 
objectives about the use of reserves. Will they be used as a supplement to war losses or 
will they be used in a unit structure to support active forces? 
If the size of the forces was not reduced, the cost of the AVF would be higher 
considering that individuals are paid very little for their service when drafted. However, 
in any case, it is obvious that the draft is an inefficient way of using national resources.' 
As the Gates commission says 
.. .the explicit cost of using military forces are underestimated, with the 
result that decisions to use the armed forces are made which perhaps 
would not be made if the true costs were known. The all-volunteer force, 
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by making economic and political costs explicit, should lead to more 
rational and democratic decisions about the use of military force.57 
The monetary service is a good alternative to the conscription-based alternatives. 
If the revenue collected from those who applied for the monetary service is used for the 
compensation of draftees, much of the opposition can be reduced. 
57
 The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, p. 154. 
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V.      CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this thesis, the inefficiencies of the current manning system have been 
explained thoroughly. The decision to establish an alternative manpower system requires 
an in-depth analysis. As previously mentioned, the method of this thesis is to apply 
economic studies. The social dimension of an alternative system is beyond the scope of 
the thesis. The defense manpower system is the most costly sector of national defense, 
which is in turn, the most costly sector of Turkish Economy. Defense departments 
employ the greatest number of people in any country where security is one of the 
priorities. Any improvement in the manpower system will be directly reflected in defense 
capability and the national budget. Although decision makers cannot agree on a unique 
system, some management principles will increase the defense outcome in any 
environment. 
A. MILITARY COMPENSATION 
Cash compensation is more useful than in-kind compensations in many cases. 
Especially since the majority of the people in the military are junior personnel, in-kind 
benefits cannot be meaningful for junior soldiers unless they use them. 
B. SUCCESS MEASUREMENT SYSTEM 
Evaluation of personnel achievements must be based on quantifiable measures. 
Subjective measures can demoralize the personnel, and personnel goals can be put ahead 
of the organization's goals. Moreover, equity of the ranks should not guarantee equity in 
compensation. Individuals who are sacrificing more must be compensated more than their 
colleagues must. 
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C. RETENTION OF EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL 
The cost of personnel increases as more experience is obtained. Therefore, the 
most costly separations are those of skilled personnel. Defense should place emphasis on 
experienced personnel. 
D. THE CONDITIONS FOR AN AVF 
1. Military Participation Ratio (MPR) 
MPR is the ratio of drafted individuals to the entire population. The MPR is 
important in that it shows what percentage of society has to pay the conscription tax. As 
Haitiner states, the MPR is a good measure of military burden-sharing.58 The MPR will 
decline as the denominator of the ratio (population level) increases. A declining MPR 
will leave two options for the country: first, to increase the force size, which will be 
costly because of unnecessary capacity; or second, to use an alternative military system. 
As seen in Table 1, Turkey is standing on a threshold. In the near future, all the 
conditions would be favorable for a successful transition to an AVF. 
2. Conscript-Volunteer Pay Ratio (CVPR) 
CVR is the ratio of the conscription wage to the wage required to fill all 
enlistment requirements by volunteers. The budget costs for countries that have a low 
CVPR would increase more than that of countries that have a high ratio in transition to an 
AVF. After the first term pay increases in 1970, the differential budget costs of an AVF 
were affordable in the U.S. military. 
58
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Total Force MPR 
% 
System 
USA 276 2577300 0.9 AVF 
GB 59 515300 0.9 AVF 
Netherlands 16 84140 0.5 AVF 
Japan 127 285900 0.2 AVF 
Canada 29 102400 0.4 AVF 
France 59 713430 1.2 Draft 
Turkey 66 988400 1.5 Draft 
Germany 82 685300 0.8 Draft 
Greece 11 450170 4.1 Draft 
Spain 39 613950 1.6 Draft 
Portugal 10 255580 2.6 Draft 
Norway 4 248700 6.2 Draft 
Table 1. The Effect of MPR on Countries' Military Systems 
Source: The Military Balance 2000/2001 (London: Oxford university Press, 2000) 
3.        Reserve Ratio 
The total force concept cannot be contemplated without the reserve forces. Since 
the cost of maintaining reserve forces is lower than that of active forces, as the ratio of 
reserve forces to active forces (RR) increases, a nation can more easily implement an 
AVF. 
E.        SUMMARY 
In Chapter II, the cost of a draft system is explained. The draft causes a 
deadweight loss, a disproportionate distribution of tax and overmanning as a result of 
cheap labor. 
In Chapter HI, the AVF system is discussed. The AVF is inevitable in the future, 
as the MPR increases. The budget cost of an AVF, which is heavily criticized, is not as 
high as draft supporters claim. 
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In Chapter IV, this study addressed the arguments against an AVF and explained 
some other draft alternatives. In the conscript alternatives, the selective monetary system 
is better than the current system. It reduces the social cost of the draft. 
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APPENDIX A. MODELS FOR TURNOVER COSTS AND 
CONSCRIPTION TAX 
A.        TURNOVER COSTS 
The model used here is imported from O'Neill's study59. First, the total strength 
of the forces is defined. 
S = 0E + Os+ST + FT+T (13) 
Where S = Total strength of force 
OE = full effective operating force 
Os = non-effective operating sector (OJT section) 
ST = student training 
FT = training support (faculty) 
T = Transient account 
As O'Neill states "the force capability is directly related to the size of 0E." The 
other sectors contribute to defense capability by maintaining the OE amount. Turnover 
costs are the result of these support sector activities.60 




i       M ^»=-TTi *100 <14) 
M=0    ;=0 
59
 O'Neill, Dave, Determinants of Labor Turnover Costs in the Military, Studies prepared for The 
President's Commission on AVF. 
60
 Ibid, p. 1-4-2. 
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Where 
CRj = the proportion of individuals who will stay in the system to start year i+1 
N = last year of service category 
The denominator of Equation 14 is called retention of accessions (expected 
number of man years per accession (K)). 
Equation 13 can be rewritten as: 
S=KAor 
n       M 
M=0   i=0 v1-V 
Where A = annual flow of accessions. 
Equation 13 with Equation 15 equals 
A = —(OE+OS+ST+FT +T) (16) K 
It is clear in the above equation that accession depends on the retention rate. If K 
is high, then accession requirements will be low. 
1. Support Sector Costs 
When an individual is inducted into a service, the training command is joined 
where a years are spent in training. After completing formal train the individual is 
assigned to operating units. The time between separation from the training command and 
joining the operating unit is the transient time (PA). During this time, individuals who 
finish service are also in a transient position, or separation transient time at (ßs). After 
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T = (ßA*bi+ßs)*A (19) 
Where bi and b2 are the average fractions of A who remain on active duty during 
OJT (equal to 1 in the draft) 
The support of the trainers is assumed to change linearly depending on the 
number of students. 
FT= a + yST (20) 
Where a = fixed component 
y = The ratio of trainers support to the number of students 
The cost of other support activities during the training and transient time can be 
similarly formalized. 
V=c+<}>S (21) 
Z= d+M/ATA+v)/sTs (22) 
Where V is the cost for other support activities during training 
Z is the cost for other support activities during transient time 
C and d are constants 
\|/A and vj/s are the elasticity for TA and Ts respectively. 
By redesigning Equation 22 and substituting the latter equations, the following 
occurs: 
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Os = ^ * 0E (23) K-äÄ2-ab,-fl7-(^1+^) 
5   = J®. *o (24) T
     K.-ab2-cfox-ay-{ßAb,+ßs) 
p ^ * (9 (25) 
T
     K-äb2-^-ar-(ßA*b]+ßs)      £ 
V = ^— *0E (26) 
K-äVab, -<*Y-(ßAb\+ßs) 
z_ YßA+Yßs *0 (27) 
K-äb2-o^,-ar-(ßA+ßs) 
ST = ^ * OE (28) T
     K-äb2-cfol-ay-(ßA*bl+ßs) 
For a given value of OE, the turnover costs can be found by using the parameters 
(bi,b2,a,ß,(j>,yAetc). 
B.        CONSCRIPTION TAX 
1. Excess Economic Cost of the Draft 
As Cooper noted,61 the economic cost of a draft system is 
E = N0J1p(s)w(s)ds (29) 
Where N= the number of persons in the eligible pool 
W(s) = supply price of the eligible pool 
P(s) = probability of serving (=1 for w<[(l+ß)/ß] w*, 
= l/(ß(w-l)) for w>[(l+ß)/ß] w* ) 
and the economic cost of an AVF is 
E-N0JBw(s)ds (30) 
61
 Cooper, p. 99. 
60 
Where 
B = proportion of the eligible pool required to serve 
2. The Conscription Tax Narrow Definition 
T = N AJ'pCsXw^-w^ds (31) 
Where A equals the proportion of the eligible pool who are true volunteers 
w*   = the draft wage 
P(s) = probability of serving (=1 for w<[(l+ß)/ß] w*, 
- l/(ß(w-l)) for w>[(l+ß)/ß] w* 
3. The Cost of Collecting the Conscription Tax 
C= N s. J' 1 /ß [In ß+ln(w(s)-w*)]ds (32) 
Where s* equals the proportion of eligible pool who are either voluntary or 
motivated by the draft such that w(s*)=[(l+ß)/ß]w* 
61 
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APPENDIX B. MODELS FOR ENLISTMENT SUPPLY AND 
DEMAND 
A.        ENLISTMENT SUPPLY 
There are six factors that influence the supply of enlistees: 
Military pay and allowances 
Civilian wage 
Unemployment level 
The eligible population base from which the military must draw its 
recruits' 
Individuals tastes for military service 62 
Enlistment standards63 
The most important factor is the ratio of the military wage to civilian wage. The 
higher the wage ratio, the higher enlistment will be. The civilian wage alternatives and 
employment level negatively affect the decision about enlistment. If more people find 
jobs to fit their tastes in the civilian economy, there will be less people who will 
potentially enlist. 
The probability of being unemployed reduces the expected civilian income and 
makes enlistment more attractive. Thus, the unemployment rate affects the decision to 
enlist. 
The attitude of people towards the military is a subjective measure. The 
differences between civilian life and military life determine the public attitude about the 
62
 Cooper, p. 159. 
63
 Nelson, Gary R., The Supply and Quality of First Term Enlistees Under the All-Volunteer Force in 
the All Volunteer Force After a Decade, ed. by William Bowman, Roger Little and G. Thomas Sicilia, 
Pergamon-Brassey's, (1986), p. 37. 
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military. In the military, the freedom of choice enjoyed by civilians does not exist.64 A 
military person cannot quit the job when the job environment is not pleasing. Overtime 
work without pay, field duty, frequent moves, and ultimate stress are the characteristics 
of military life. To compete with civilians, the military must compensate for these 
disadvantages. The military can change the attitudes of people by introducing new 
policies. 
Recruitment activities directly affect the outcome as well. These activities include 
advertisement and work done by recruiters. By entering the above factors in a model, a 
recruitment function is found:65 
E/P=f[(W/C),M,R,U,T] 
Where E = the number of enlistees 
P = the population base 
W = military wage 
C = civilian wage 
M = other tangible aspects of military employment 
R = recruiting effort 
U = unemployment level 
T = taste for military service 
Cooper states that a logistic model would explain the enlistment supply.66 
64
 A report to the President on the Status and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Force, (1982). 
65
 Cooper, p. 160. 
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s=l/(l+e-XB) (33) 
Where XB=b0+biw+b2r+b3u+ v 
S = enlisted number /population base ratio(E/P) 
bi = coefficient of the variables 
w = military wage/civilian wage ratio(W/C) 
r = number of recruiters/population base ratio(R/P) 
u = unemployment rate 
v = stochastic error term 
The coefficients can be found in regression analysis. With logarithms: 
ln-^- = b0 + blw + b2r + b3u + v (34) 
l-s 
B.        ENLISTMENT DEMAND 
■   The demand side of enlistment is crucial for the success of an AVF. The 
downsizing of the size of the force will help the AVF. Thus, the demand of enlistment 
depends on "the desired force strength, the losses in the service and reserve activation". 
ESr= ESt.i + At - L,+ RAt- RDt or (35) 
Ar= (ES, - ESt-i)+ Lt-(RAt- RDt) (36) 
Where ES, = end strength in year t 
At = accession requirements in year t 
Lt = losses in year t 
66
 The Gate's commission studies showed that the fitness factor(R2)is higher for a logit function than 
the other functions. 
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RAt=reserve activation in year t 
RDt=reserve deactivation in year t 
If Equation 35 is rewritten in terms of the size of the force size: 
A,    _ES,-ES,_l     RAI-RDI+JLL_ (3?) 
ES,_, ES,_X ES,_, ES,_, 
Or, 
at = est - nrt +lt 
Where at = accession rate 
est = percentage change in end strength 
nrt = net reserve activation rate 
lt = loss rate(expressed as a percentage of previous year's .end strength) 
Some other policies can affect the accession rate as well. For example, the 
reliance for junior personnel versus experienced personnel, the civil substitution or and 
preference of non-high school category I -III people to the high school graduate category 
IV. These policies 
Excluding force strength variation, if the attrition of the first term can be 
controlled, the military can reduce accession requirements considerably. As Nelson 
mentions, the first term attrition is costly in several ways: 67 
1. Losses may represent potentially productive trained man-years and 
hence a less capable force 
2. Higher losses produce larger requirements for non-prior service 
enlistments and may require more recruiters or higher pay for recruits. 
67
 Nelson, p. 28. 
66 
3.   Higher losses create additional costs for training and other turnover- 
related items. 
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